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2019 saw a paradox. A strong, stable government was in power in New Delhi, armed with an overwhelming majority, a strong and popular leader, risk-taking appetite, the inclination to take radical decisions, and a weak opposition. At the same time, there was instability, largely emanating from the government’s own policy measures, and an economic slowdown, which appears both structural and cyclical.
It is the intersection of these two strands — of a strong government and seeds of instability — which will define the India of 2020. And in that intersection will lie the challenge of reviving the India story, at home and abroad.
But let’s first examine what have been the components of the India story.
The first element of this was the economy. After the reforms of 1991, the world woke up to India’s potential as a market and economic powerhouse. The middle class boomed, with growing aspirations, new opportunities, and a willingness to spend. India became more economically integrated with the world. It also became an important player in the new knowledge economy, which rested on technology and innovation. And the Indian State became richer. Tens of millions of Indians stopped being poor.
The second element was strategic. As Delhi gained in economic muscle, it also expanded its strategic footprint. The world — particularly the developed countries in the West — began to value New Delhi as a reliable partner, which played by the rules of the international order. It also began to see in India a counterweight to China.
And finally, there was a political element to it — India’s democratic credentials and its possession of a vibrant media and active civil society; its diversity including a large Muslim population with no — or very limited — radicalisation; and the fact that it was multicultural long before the term acquired traction in the West. All of these political values also made it a pillar of the democratic world.
2019 was the year when these elements of the India story came under strain.
Politically, India showed its electoral democracy was robust. Over 600 million voters participated in the national election in a stunning display of exercising independent political choice. Narendra Modi returned to power. The country democratically elected a legitimate, strong government. At the same time, as state polls towards the end of the year showed, there were checks and balances within the democratic system. The opposition parties gained two crucial states of Maharashtra and Jharkhand. But it was not the hardware of democracy, but the software of it which provoked concerns. The government’s measures in Kashmir — particularly the clampdown on civil liberties — led to democracy colliding with what the state saw as legitimate security interests. The National Register of Citizens in Assam — which was a court-mandated process — had high human costs and led to exclusion of close to two million residents, leaving them potentially stateless if they did not get reprieve from tribunals. The passage of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act saw protests, largely driven by the view that India’s secular fabric was being undermined. The crackdown in Uttar Pradesh in particular saw minorities becoming victims of police excesses. All of this was coupled with increasing questions about the independence of Indian institutions.
This was coupled with the cracks in the economy. GDP growth slowed down to 4.5%. Investment was down, so was consumption. Even as the markets soared, conversations with industry revealed a dip in sentiment. The rural economy continued to face a crisis — with a dip in farm incomes and its multiplier effect on the rest of the rural economy. All of this led to a dip in growth forecasts. And investors and the international community began asking questions about whether India’s economic strength was overestimated.
And the final element was strategic. In an uncertain world order, where United States president Donald Trump’s mercurial diplomacy had thrown both allies and adversaries off gear, the US-India relationship suddenly did not look as robust as the past. Trade emerged as a big irritant. India’s political shifts drew criticism from the Democrat end of the political spectrum in US, as well as European governments. Delhi’s decision to stay out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership created apprehensions in Asia-Pacific about India’s commitment to the region (although there were enough reasons not to sign on). And ties with neighbours continued to be mixed, with the Chinese presence expanding in each capital in South Asia.
2020 will thus be the year when India has to revive its story, domestically and globally.
It has to politically show to critics at home and the world outside that its democracy is fully functional and vibrant; it remains committed to its constitutional values and secular framework; and that it will be freedom, not curbs, which will define the government’s approach to its citizens and troubled regions. It has to ensure that its economic reforms translate into higher growth, investment picks up, demand gets a boost, and there is, yet again, a virtuous cycle which makes India an attractive destination.
And strategically, it has to ensure that it retains bipartisan support in the US; its image across the spectrum — including the strong liberal constituency in western capitals — is intact. It has to show to Asia its commitment to the region, and it has to find subtle but effective ways to influence developments in the neighbourhood to safeguard its presence and offset China.
The India of 2020 will determine the trajectory of the country for years to come. Getting the politics, economy and foreign policy right — or repairing the broken elements — will get India back on the path of becoming a country that strives to give its citizens both freedom and prosperity. But a further erosion on these indicators will have long-term adverse implications, for rights of Indian citizens, incomes of its aspirational young people, and the country’s global standing. 2020 is the year when India has to choose wisely.
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